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Introduction 
Peacekeeping operations under United Nations auspices have 
achieved notable results in recent years, in countries as far apart 
as Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador and Bosnia. At the same time, 
UN peacekeeping is in crisis, because of a host of factors: tried 
and tested principles and practices of UN peacekeeping have had 
to be modified or abandoned; there have been repeated difficulties 
in the control and management of UN operations; the distinction 
between peacekeeping and enforcement has become blurred; 
states have imposed numerous conditions on their participation in 
operations; the many proposals to place forces at the general 
disposal of the UN have failed; peacekeeping finance remains a 
nightmare; some operations, as in Angola, have been followed by 
a resumption of war; the range of conflicts around the world far 
exceeds the UN's capacity to address them; and there have been 
accusations of bias in the choice of which conflicts to address, 
and the manner of doing so. There has been a bewildering variety 
of diagnoses, and of prescriptions for improvement. This paper 
looks briefly at the following questions: 
I. Should UN peacekeeping operations be seen as part of an 
overall system of collective security? Are we at a time of 
opportunity, now that the Cold War is over, for the UN to have 
a more central role in security questions generally? 
2. Wbat were the essential features of UN peacekeeping up to 
1987? 
3. How has the character of UN peacekeeping changed since 
1988? Is a new hybrid form of action emerging? What are the 
consequences of the reduction in emphasis on the requirement 
that the parties in a conflict consent to the presence of 
peacekeeping forces? What are the consequences of the 
greater willingness to use force in connection with peace-
keeping operations? 
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\4. In what kinds of crises can UN peacekeeping usefully become 
involved, and in what kinds is it inappropriate? 
5. What are the key issues which now need to be addressed by 
member states and by the UN? 
1. Can UN peacekeeping be seen as part of 
a collective security system? 
The framework in which we consider the specific problems is 
important. Peacekeeping operations are only one part of the 
response of the international community to situations of 
international and internal conflict. By common consent, even if 
there is some overlap in practice, they are distinct from many 
other types of action under UN auspices, including enforcement 
actions. The way in which peacekeeping does, or does not, fit into 
a larger picture of UN action has a strong bearing on how the 
whole subject is considered, and on what action is taken. 
In the post-Cold War era, the problems of peacekeeping have 
often been discussed in a broader context of seeing an opportunity 
to establish a new system of peace and security based on the UN. 
In 1993 Brian Urquhart asked the key question: 'Are we trying to 
establish a comprehensive system of international peace and 
security based on the resources and the political will of the 
membership of the United Nations?' 1 In my submission there are 
grounds for doubt as to whether the aim should be set quite so 
high. Is such a system actually attainable, and what would it 
actually look like? 
1 Brian Urquhart, 'The Future of Peace-keeping', paper at the June 
1993 Oslo Symposium on Collective Responses to Common Threats, 
p. 3. 
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Four principal considerations make me pessimistic about the 
chances of establishing a substantially new system of peace and 
security, of which peacekeeping would be one part: 
(i) The idea of a fundamentally new security system involves, 
in addition to peacekeeping, heavy reliance on 'collective 
security': this term refers to a system in which an attack on 
one member of the international community is treated as an 
attack on all, and leads to a strong and decisive response by 
the community. The idea of collective security is a very old 
one, which has perennially run into difficulties; and much 
present advocacy of it does not take into account the past 
history and problems of the idea.' 
(ii) On the more specific topic of peacekeeping - the central 
concern of this paper- nothing in the past record or present 
performance of UN peacekeeping operations entitles us to 
see these activities as a viable response to more than a 
limited, albeit somewhat expanding, range of situations. 
(iii) The genius of the UN system, and a key to its modest but 
still remarkable success in the past half century, is its 
relatively successful combination of, on the one hand, 
acceptance of sovereign states which retain their military 
power and their right to individual and collective self-
defence; and, on the other hand, establishment of the 
rudiments of a structure for cooperative decision-making 
2 The difficulties of the idea of collective security are outlined in the 
introductory chapter in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), 
United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International 
Relations, 2nd edn., Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 29-31. For a 
succint survey and assessment of the history of UN peacekeeping, see 
Sally Morphet's chapter in the same book, pp. 183-239. 
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and multilateral military action in a UN framework in at 
least a substantial range of situations. 
This dual aspect of the UN system can be found in 
the Charter itself. Many of its provisions contain much more 
generous allowance for the continued role of states, and 
even continued state control of military power, than did the 
League ofNations Covenant. Particular Charter provisions 
illustrating this point include Article 51, with its famous 
passage on 'individual or collective self-defence'; Article 
2(7) on domestic jurisdiction; and the extreme caution ofthe 
references to disarmament in Article 11(1), 26, and 47(1). 
(iv) The Cold War was not the only factor which prevented the 
UN system from managing security issues on the largely 
cooperative basis which might seem to have been envisaged 
in the Charter. As is now rapidly becoming apparent, there 
are other and more enduring factors in international politics 
which make difficult or impossible the realization of the 
dream of all major security problems being handled in a UN 
framework. In particular, states seem to guard their power 
over their own armed forces jealously. It is significant that 
in almost half a century since the UN was founded, not one 
state has concluded an agreement making forces available 
to the UN in the manner provided for in Article 43 of the 
UN Charter. We have to draw serious conclusions from this 
about the viability of supra-national visions of a UN security 
system. 
These four reasons for pessimism may well be ignored in this 
period in which there are high expectations of what the UN can 
achieve. Yet ignoring these factors, and holding out excessively 
high hopes for the UN, is liable to lead to disappointment and 
recrimination. Indeed, if the UN is seen as in some way 
supplanting existing functions of states, there is a strong 
likelihood that the sovereign state, which is far from dead, will 
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reassert its existence and vitality at the expense of the UN, with 
serious consequences for the latter. 
Despite the grounds for pessimism, there are in fact elements 
of a system of international security. This system encompasses a 
wide range of measures of arms limitation, including in the field 
of nuclear non-proliferation. There is also a strong emphasis on 
force only being used for defensive purposes. There are also many 
elements which are different from what was laid down in the UN 
Charter: the pattern of certain uses of force by coalitions being 
authorized by the UN Security Council- as in Korea in·I950, over 
Kuwait in 1990-91, and in Somalia in 1992-3; the emergence of 
an impressive practice of mediation and good offices within a UN 
framework; and, of course, UN peacekeeping. 
2. Essential features of UN peacekeeping 
up to 1987 
It is notorious that peacekeeping operations were not foreseen in 
the UN Charter, and emerged on an ad hoc basis in response to 
urgent problems. Indeed, the precise Charter basis for many UN 
peacekeeping operations remained ambiguous for decades. It was 
often referred to as a 'Chapter VI and a half' activity, meaning that 
it fell uncertainly somewhere between Chapter VI, on Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes, and Chapter VII, on Action with Respect 
to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of 
Aggression. As long as the fundamental basis of peacekeeping 
forces remained the consent of the parties, and the Security 
Council acted properly according to its own procedures, it did not 
matter that the precise Charter basis for the action that was taken 
floated a little uncertainly between Chapters VI and VII. · 
In the period up to the end of 1987, there were thirteen UN 
peacekeeping operations, all but one of which were concerned 
with conflicts that had arisen following European decolonization: 
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many other problems, including more directly East-West 
conflicts. were addressed through other mechanisms, mainly 
outside a UN framework. 
The traditional tasks of UN peacekeeping operations, as they 
evolved from the 1950s to the 1970s, includ,e-6 monitoring and 
enforcement of cease-fires; observation of frontier lines; and 
interposition between belligerents. These tasks were generally 
carried out on the basis of three key principles: the consent of the 
parties, impartiality of the peacekeepers, and non-use of force in 
most circumstances. These three principles were seen as being 
interlinked, and as being fundamental to the effectiveness of 
peacekeeping operations.' 
Non-use of force, though not an absolute principle, was central 
to the practice of UN peacekeeping for many years. As Marrack 
Goulding has said: 
Afore than half the organization's peacekeeping operations before 
1988 had consisted only of unarmed military observers. But when 
operations were armed, it had become an established principle that 
they should use force only to the minimum extent necessary and that 
normally fire should be opened only in self-defence. 
However, since 1973 self-defence had been deemed to include 
situations in which peacekeepers were being prevented by armed 
persons from fit/filling their mandate. This was a wide definition of 
'self-defence'. In practice commanders in the field had only very 
rarely taken advantage of the authority to open fire on,for instance, 
soldiers at a roadblock who were denying passage to a United 
Nations convoy. This reluctance was based on sound calculations 
related to impartiality, to their reliance on the continued cooperation 
of the parties and to the fact that their force's level of armament was 
3 For a short and clear account of the inter-related character ofthese 
principles, see F.T. Liu, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use 
afForce, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1992. 
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based on the assumption that the parties would comply with their 
commitments.4 
On the basis of the principles established during the first four 
decades, he went on to define UN peacekeeping as follows: 
Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent 
of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts 
between them, under United Nations command and control, at the 
expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other 
personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting 
impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum 
exte~t necessary: 5 
In the first decades of UN peacekeeping operations, the 
requirement of impartiality and disinterestedness was among the 
factors leading to the general practice of not using certain 
countries' troops. In particular, the UN for the most part avoided 
use of contingents from the permanenet five (especially China and 
the two superpowers); and it also avoided relying on forces from 
neighbouring powers. The merits of these practices were obvious: 
local conflicts were insulated from Cold war rivalry and regional 
hegemony. The weaknesses of the practice were equally obvious: 
UN forces sometimes lacked the authority and strength that a 
great power presence could have provided; or they lacked the 
local knowledge, interest, and staying power that forces from a 
neighbouring power might have had. 
4 Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, 
in his Cyril Foster Lecture at Oxford University, 4 March 1993, 'The 
Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping', International Affairs, vol. 
69, no. 3 (July 1993), p. 455. 
'Goulding, 'The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping', p. 455. 
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There was no shortage of problems in the first thirteen UN 
peacekeeping operations. The weakness of depending on the 
consent of the host state was cruelly exposed by the expulsion of 
the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from Egypt in 
1967, and the subsequent outbreak of war between Israel and a 
number of Arab states including Egypt. Sometimes in practice the 
performance of the original mandate led on to additional tasks 
which did not sit easily with the three principles outlined above. 
In the Congo in 1960-64 the tasks of the UN force came to 
include assisting in the maintenance of government and public 
order, and the use of military force to achieve these ends against 
a variety of challenges: this early case of peacekeeping becoming 
transformed into enforcement succeeded, but at a huge price. In 
Cyprus in 1974, and in Lebanon in 1982, the presence of UN 
peacekeeping forces could not prevent breakdowns of an order 
including major foreign invasions and seizures of territory. 
The achievements of UN peacekeeping, although modest, were 
real: they included the effective freezing of certain conflicts; 
some reduction of the risk, or extent, of competitive interventions 
by neighbouring or major powers; and isolation of some local 
conflicts from the East-West struggle, so that they did not 
exacerbate the latter. In short, some wars were prevented from 
spreading, and some missions effectively accomplished. While 
the development of UN peacekeeping before the end of the Cold 
War was impressive, it would be wrong to depict it as a golden 
era.6 
6 On the development of UN peacekeeping, see especially 
Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 4 vols., Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1969-81; United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United 
Nations Peace-Keeping, 2nd edn., UN Dept. of Public Information, New 
York, 1990; and William J. Durch (ed.), The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analyses, St Martin's Prss, 
Nw York, 1993. 
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3. How has the character of UN peacekeeping 
changed? 
In the past six years there has been a dramatic expansion of the 
number of UN peacekeeping and observer forces. The often 
repeated, constantly changing, and ever more impressive litany of 
statistics shows just how remarkable the expansion has been. 
From 1948 to 1978, thirteen peacekeeping and observer forces 
were set up. Then for ten years no new ones were established. 
Since early 1988 a further twenty have been created.' 
Now peacekeeping is in a new era, tackling a vast array of new 
problems. However, many of the new commitments involve 
peacekeeping forces in performing a bewildering variety of tasks 
with an unusually complex set of mandates. In both Somalia and 
Yugosla~ia, as discussed later, these mandates involved 
authorization of force by or on behalf of peacekeeping forces: a 
step towards enforcement. 
Reasons for the expansion of peacekeeping activities 
A main reason for this expansion in the number of peacekeeping 
and observer rhis~ions has been, simply, the increased capacity of 
the Security Council, to reach agreement on action in particular 
crises once it was no lqnger hamstrung by the previously heavy 
use of the veto by four o\the Permanent Five members. The last-
ever Soviet veto was qn 29 February 1984, on a resolution 
proposing an extension in the Beirut area of what was at that time 
the last UN peacekeeping force to have been created (UNIFIL in 
I 
7 For a lisvfr the 33 UN Peacekeeping and Observer Forces 
established tf.fie, see the Appendix to this paper. 
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Lebanon). From 1984 to 31 May 1990, thirty-two Security 
Council resolutions on a variety of topics were vetoed by the 
USA, in some cases with British and/or French support; but no 
resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union or China. Then from 
May 1990 to 11 May 1993 there was not a single use of the veto, 
though of course its very existence still powerfully influenced 
decisions. On 11 May 1993 Russia broke the record three-year 
period of non-use when it vetoed a resolution on the financing of 
the long-established peacekeeping force in Cyprus. It is 
significant that ·it was on a peacekeeping issue that use of the veto 
resumed: Russia had reason to resent being asked to bear the 
financial burden of UN peacekeeping in the apparently stable 
island of Cyprus, at a time when the UN was hardly making a 
notable contribution to the much more urgent crises faced by 
Russia both internally and on its borders. Despite this use of the 
veto by Russia in 1993, which may be a harbinger of things to 
come, the new-found capacity of the Security Council to reach 
agreement has more or less survived, and constitutes a key part of 
the explanation of the increase in the number of peacekeeping 
operations. 8 
A further factor leading to the expansion of peacekeeping has 
been a widespread mood of optimism that the UN can have a 
much more central role in international security matters, and that 
peacekeeping can take on a very wide range of urgent problems. 
National governments as well as the UN itself shared this mood 
to a surprising degree. The heads of government at the Security 
Council summit at the end of January 1992, and Secretary-
' Statistics on the use of the veto to date may be found in Adam 
Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.}, United Nations, Divided World, 
2nd edn., pp. 10-11. China has been far the most abstemious power, 
having only used the veto three times: once in 1955 (when it was 
represented at the UN by the regime in Taiwan}, and twice in 1972. 
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General Boutros-Ghali in his An Agenda for Peace published in 
June 1992, reflected and for a period reinforced this optimism. 9 
Finally, the end of the Cold War, and in particular the 
circumstances in a number of countries undergoing severe 
conflicts, created an increased need for international peace-
keeping forces. In particular: (I) The peace agreements (all with 
an East-West dimension) ending foreign interventions and/or 
conflicts--in Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia, Central America, and 
Cambodia--created a demand for impartial international forces to 
assist in implementing their provisions on such matters as 
monitoring cease-fires, troop withdrawals, and elections. (2) The 
decline and collapse of Communist systems resulted, in some 
cases, in new conflicts: and some of these (especially in former 
Yugoslavia) led to strong calls for action under UN auspices. (3) 
Following the end of the Cold War, the major powers were less 
likely than before to see a conflict in a distant country in 
geostrategic terms as part of a challenge to them from their major 
global adversary which required them to make an essentially 
unilateral military riposte: they were therefore more willing to see 
a response emerge from within a UN framework. 
It is not so clear that the expansion of peacekeeping has been 
the result in all cases of careful consideration of its appropriate-
ness to the particular challenges faced, and the nature of the tasks 
which have to be performed. Indeed, in some cases consigning 
problems to be handled under UN auspices may be, as it was 
9 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive 
Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, United Nations, New 
York, 1992. For a challenging article of the same period, calling for the 
major powers to give 'unconditional subordination of an appropriate 
element of their effective military assets to an integrated UN command 
system ' see John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, 'Second Generation 
Multinational Operations', The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1992, pp. 
131-31. 
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sometimes in the Cold War years, a substitute rather than a recipe 
for effective action. 
New types of task for UN peacekeeping 
Since the late 1980s UN peacekeeping operations have involved 
a remarkably wide variety of activities, some ofwich have simply 
been new versions of familiar tasks. One is the monitoring of 
cease-fires: however, in some recent cases, as in former 
Yugoslavia and Georgia, the cease-fires have been short-lived, 
posing acute problems for UN forces. Another familiar task has 
been monitoring agreed withdrawals of foreign forces from 
countries in which they had been involved: this has on the whole 
worked well -as in Afghanistan, Angola and Namibia- and has 
performed a valuable verification and confidence-building 
function. 
Other tasks assigned to peacekeeping operations since 1988 
have been partly or wholly new for them: 
* monitoring and even running elections (as in Namibia, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Angola, Cambodia, and Mozam-
bique). 
* protecting inhabitants of a region, whether the majority or 
minorities, from the threat or use of force--including by the 
government of the region and/or country (part of the function 
in the three United Nations Protected Areas, or UNPAs, in 
Croatia). 
* assuring delivery of humanitarian relief, and the performance 
of a wide range of other humanitarian tasks, during conflicts 
(especially in former Yugoslavia and Somalia). 
* assisting in the reconstruction of certain governmental or 
police functions after civil war (including in El Salvador and 
Cambodia). 
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There should be no objection in principle to developing and 
expanding the tasks of peacekeeping. New circumstances have 
required new forms of action, and have presented some 
opportunities that had to be seized. Indeed, some of the 
developments since the late 1980s are extremely promising. 
Election-monitoring under UN auspices has had many 
successes. Sometimes, as in Nicaragua and Haiti, UN election 
verification was conducted on its own, not as part of a peace-
keeping mission. However, several agreements in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s seeking to end internal conflicts, including in 
their international aspects, provided both for elections as an 
acceptable means of determining who was to rule, and for 
peacekeeping forces whose tasks included monitoring or even 
helping organize the elections. Such outside assistance failed to 
prevent a renewed outbreak of civil war in Angola in 1992 Gust 
as verification had been unable to prevent a coup in Haiti in 
September 1991 ). However, the picture elsewhere looks more 
hopeful. This function is particularly significant, for two reasons. 
First, it associates the UN with the idea of multi-party democracy. 
Second, it enables peacekeeping forces to be involved in 
something more than the mere freezing of conflicts: in some 
countries (though not in all), UN forces can achieve more by 
assisting in ballots than by interposing themselves between 
belligerents. 
However, assisting democracy, like other aspects of UN 
peacekeeping, depends powerfully on local cooperation. Where 
this is denied or withdrawn, problems begin. The nature of post-
conflict societies can make the realization of democracy a distant 
goal. A United Nations which concerns itself with the type of 
government in member states may find itself involved in a wide 
range of complex and dangerous disputes. Sometimes, as in the 
debacle over Haiti in 1993, the UN may be powerless in face of 
even a small and weakly armed sovereign state. 
Many other aspects of the expanded character of UN 
peacekeeping have been problematical. 'Humanitarian relief' is a 
15 
case in point. Too often, the natural emphasis on such relief has 
been accompanied by a failure to think through the broader 
questions raised by an involvement. It may be necessary, but it is 
never enough, to say that the UN's role in a crisis is essentially 
humanitarian. There is also a need for tough analysis of the 
problems and crises which created the need for aid, and of 
policies for tackling them. 
Some possible implications of the expanded character of UN 
peacekeeping have received very little attention. This is most 
obviously the case as regards the exercise of certain governmental 
functions in states which have experienced civil war and in some 
cases fallen apart completely. Up to now UN peacekeeping 
operations have only been involved in governmental functions in 
a limited way, as in El Salvador, Cambodia, Somalia, and the UN 
Protected Areas in Croatia. 10 Advising, training and assisting 
police has been a prominent aspect of such activities. Often the 
focus has been as much on regional administration as on central 
government. Although success has been limited, the question of 
taking on a larger administrative role keeps cropping up. There 
have been some tentative proposals for possible UN adminis-
tration of Sarajevo and/or other parts of Bosnia as part of a 
Bosnian peace settlement. A major difficulty is that the historical 
record of various forms of mandate, trusteeship, and international 
administration has been mixed. However, proposals for such 
arrangements have continued to appear in international diplo-
macy, and the concept certainly merits contemporary re-
10 For an account of UNPROFOR's record in Croatia, including its 
failure to demilitarize, or control the activities of, the Serb forces in the 
UN Protected Areas, see Alan James, 'The UN in Croatia: An Exercise 
in Futility?', The World Today, vol. 49, no. 5 (May 1993), pp. 93-6. 
16 
consideration." There has been little sign of willingness on the 
part of the UN or its leading members to accept some kind of 
trusteeship role as one possible consequence of taking on 
responsibilities in areas where order has broken down, a question 
to which I return at the end. 
The central difficulty in the expansion of tasks of UN 
peacekeeping has been in the blurring of the lines between 
peacekeeping and coercive action. This is intimately linked to a 
tendency to down-grade the requirement of consent of the parties 
as a pre-condition for setting up and maintaining a peacekeeping 
operation. There is a much more interventionist element m 
peacekeeping today, and this is at the heart of the crisis. 
Consent as a basis for peacekeeping 
The down-grading of the consent of the parties as a requirement 
for UN action occurred in three important crises in 1991-3, and 
was accompanied by a change in doctrine regarding peacekeeping 
operations. 
The establishment of the Kurd-inhabited 'safe havens' areas in 
northern Iraq in April 1991 was achieved, not by any formal UN 
peacekeeping force, but by US, British and French forces. These 
were subsequently replaced by a small group of UN guards, who 
were entirely distinct from peacekeeping forces. This experience 
did, however, mark a decisive crossing of an important line about 
the requirements for action under UN auspices. There was no 
Iraqi consent to the initial incursion of coalition forces; and 
11 See Gerald B. Helman and Steven R Ratner, ' Saving Failed States' 
Foreign Policy, no 89 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 3-20; and Peter Lyon, 'The 
Rise and Fall and Possible Revival oflntemational Trusteeship', Journal 
of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, no 31 (March 1993), pp. 
96-110. 
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although there were subsequently Iraqi-UN agreements under 
which the UN guards were sent to northern Iraq, clearly Iraq's 
consent was in some measure the outcome of the earlier forcible 
incursion." This action under UN auspices, because it both saved 
large numbers of lives and showed some degree of ability to act 
against the wishes of a sovereign state, strongly influenced 
subsequent UN action in other crises. 
Less than a year later, in the exceptionally difficult circum-
stances of the wars in former Yugoslavia, a second case arose in 
which the issue of consent was in practice more. complex and 
nuanced than in the theory: and this time, a UN peacekeeping · 
force was involved. The original Security Council resolution of 
February 1992 authorizing the United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia, while containing evidence 
of elements of consent, also specified that the Council was acting 
under its responsibility 'for the maintenance of international peace 
and security'--a coded reference to Chapter VII of the Charter; 
and, by referring to Article 25 of the Charter, reminded states of 
their formal obligation to accept and carry out the decisions ofthe 
Security Council. Further, this resolution set UNPROFOR up for 
a definite term which was a matter for decision by the Security 
Council." All of this implied, at the very least, that although the 
operation began with a degree of consent of the parties, it might 
continue even without that consent. Subsequent resolutions have 
continued along similar lines. 
12 The texts of the agreements between the UN and Iraq are in UN 
doe. S/22663 of 3 I May I 99 I. See also Lawrence Freedman and David 
Boren, "'Safe Havens" for Kurds in Post-War Iraq', in Nigel Rodley 
(ed.), To Loose the Bands of Wickedness: International Intervention in 
Defence of Human Rights, Brassey's, London, I 992, pp. 43-92. 
13 Security Council Resolution 743 of21 Feb. 1992, prearoble and 
para. 3. 
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Within a few months of the establishment ofUNPROFOR, the 
downgrading of consent as an absolute requirement for 
peacekeeping was also apparent in Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for 
Peace. This famously defined peacekeeping reads as follows: 
Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the 
field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally 
involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and 
frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that 
expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the 
making of peace." 
The 'hitherto' in that definition became the subject of much 
comment from individuals and states. There were two main 
grounds for concern. First, that tried and tested principles of UN 
peacekeeping were being changed, and perhaps fatally weakened, 
without full discussion of all the implications; and second, many 
individuals and states (mainly small and/or developing ones) 
feared a new interventionism. 
In Somalia, especially from December 1992 onwards, the 
criterion of consent has been further down-graded. There was no 
functioning government there to give or refuse consent. Also, as 
in Yugoslavia, the number of parties to the conflict and the 
disputes about their status made consent of all the parties hard to 
obtain and impossible to maintain. The UN Security Council 
explicitly referred to its powers under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter when it made its decisions to establish the two principal 
forces in Somalia: 
14 An Agenda for Peace, para. 20. 
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1. The US-led Unified Task Force (UN1TAF), the multi-state 
force under US command which operated in Somalia from 
December 1992 to May 1993.15 This is not generally regarded 
as a UN force, nor as a pure peacekeeping force, but rather as 
a UN-authorized force roughly comparable, so far as its legal 
basis and command system is concerned, to the US-led 
coalition forces in Korea in 1950-53 and in the Kuwait crisis 
in 1990-91. It had some liaison with the UN, and with the 
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), the UN 
peacekeeping force which had been set up earlier in 199~, and 
whose inability to fulfil its mandate had led to the creatiOn of 
UNITAF. 
2. The United Nations Operation in Somalia 11 (UNOSOM 11) 
since it took over responsibilities and personnel from UNITAF 
in May 1993. Although this is designated as a UN peace-
keeping force, it was from the start a most unusual one. Its 
authorizing resolution departs in a number of ways from the 
traditional mandate of peacekeeping forces. It explicitly refers 
to Chapter VII, and clearly leaves room for a greater use of 
force than was typical for UN forces. 
Thus in the post-Cold War era two UN peacekeeping forces, 
UNPROFOR and UNOSOM I!, have been set up largely in the 
framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and without relying 
on consent of the parties to quite the same extent as in earlier 
cases. This marks a very significant watershed in the history of 
the organization. 
This reduction in the emphasis on consent has happened for 
good reasons, which include a desire to overcome the past 
" UNITAF was authorized by SC Res. 794 of 3 Dec. I 992. This 
explicitly bases it on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
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weaknesses of peacekeeping, as in the Middle East in 1967. There 
has also been a need for a new approach to the issue of consent 
because in situations of chaos such as the UN has encountered 
recently a peacekeeping force cannot be allowed to have its entire 
continued existence dependent on the whim of every local leader. 
Yet down-grading the consent of the parties as a key criterion 
for action takes peacekeeping into dangerous territory, involving 
it in a series of tasks for which it was hardly ready. The very lack 
of a formal Charter framework for all peacekeeping operations 
may have facilitated a tendency, evident in these cases, to regard 
peacekeeping as a flexible technique which can be radically 
adapted as regards its legal basis, its purposes, and its mode of 
operating; and to apply it to situations of great difficulty, where 
it is not necessarily appropriate. 
Use of force 
Directly associated with the issue of consent is the issue of 
readiness to use force. In the past, UN forces had been em-
powered to use force when directly threatened, or when their 
central activities were being openly opposed: but they had seldom 
actually resorted to major uses of force. In some peacekeeping 
operations in recent years there have been unprecedented threats 
and uses of force. Security Council resolution 836 of 4 June 1993, 
authorizing force in defence of UN safe areas in Bosnia, is a 
landmark in this regard. 
In Namibia in April 1989, the UN representatives authorized, 
or at least tolerated, a South African use of force against 
infiltrators from SWAPO (the South West Africa People's 
Organization): this was a necessary precondition for the success 
of the UN peacekeeping and election-monitoring operation. 
Events in a number of recent conflicts, particularly those in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia, have been seen as reinforcing 
the need for peacekeeping to have teeth. There has been proper 
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revulsion over a situation in which parties to a conflict can, at 
will, stop the distribution of aid, prevent the rotation of UN 
peacekeeping troops, bombard cities, maintain cruel sieges, and 
commit war crimes: all with UN forces looking on, and seemingly 
powerless to act. The calls for action have been made stronger by 
the fact that UN forces frequently assist the passage of journalists, 
whose reports on what they have seen inevitably lead to demands 
to put things right. 
An increased willingness to use force in support of UN 
purposes was apparent in certain passages of An Agenda for 
Peace. Enforcement was presented as an activity which would be 
likely to require separate and distinct forces: 
Cease-fires have often been agreed to but not complied with, and the 
United Nations has sometimes been called upon to send forces to 
restore and maintain the cease-fire. This task can on occasion exceed 
the mission of peace-keeping forces· and the expectations of peace-
keeping force contributors. I recommend that the Council consider 
the utilization of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined 
circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in 
·advance. 16 
Others took a similar view. For example, F.T. Liu proposed at 
around the same time that a first-tier peacekeeping force would be 
deployed in an area of operation as usual and would act as a trip-
wire. This would be backed up by a special second-tier task force 
held in reserve near the force headquarters: 'if one of the parties 
to the conflict threatened the UN line troops or attempted to 
prevent them from fulfilling their duties by forceful means, the 
16 An Agenda for Peace, para. 44. 
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special task force would be called in to resolve or contain the 
situation by a show offorce.' 17 
In practice, what has happened has been different. The new 
breed of UN 'peace-enforcement units' envisaged in An Agenda 
for Peace has not been created. Instead, the functions envisaged 
for it have been assigned in an ad hoc manner to national forces 
(as in Namibia, and with certain US actions in Somalia), to 
NATO forces (as in the air exclusion zone over Bosnia and also 
in the Sarajevo exclusion), and to UN peacekeeping forces them-
selves (as with certain aspects of the operations in former 
Yugoslavia and Somalia). 
One form of association of peacekeeping with a readiness to 
use force is preventive deployment. Since December 1992, part 
of UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia has been stationed in 
Macedonia to discourage possible attacks on that former 
Yugoslav republic. This kind of preventive deployment may have 
considerable potential, and is one of the most interesting new uses 
of peacekeeping forces. However, it is a much more directly 
military function than past peacekeeping efforts. It is not certain 
that the label 'peacekeeping' is appropriate in such a case. 
The main practical problems arising from the greater 
willingness to use force in connection with peacekeeping 
operations have arisen, not in the context of preventive deploy-
ments, but rather in cases of continuing conflict where action 
needs to be taken. When, as in Somalia and Bosnia, local parties 
defy existing agreements, and also the Security Council's 
pronouncements, the demand for action becomes strong, but the 
dilemmas involved are difficult. 
The first dilemma is that any strong use of force, by or on 
behalf of peacekeepers, may help restore their credibility, but it 
may also increase the risks to lightly-armed peacekeepers in 
17 F.T. Liu, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force, 
p.42. 
23 
vulnerable positions. As events in Somalia have suggested, they .. 
may be more exposed to attack, robbery, or being taken hostage 
than they w~re before. Regarding Bosnia, this fear led to repeated 
discussion of the possibility that peacekeepers might have to be 
withdrawn before any military action was taken: in which case, 
the much-discussed 'peacekeeping with muscles' would have 
involved a significant diminution in the range of activities which 
peacekeepers could undertake. 
The second dilemma, closely related to the first, is that the use 
of force in complex civil wars frequently involves killing and 
injuring civilians as well as armed adversaries. If such things 
happen, as they did in Somalia in 1993, accusations of acting in 
a brutal or colonial manner are bound to be made: neither the UN 
nor its leading members are immune from such accusations. 
Military disasters may result from air strikes, from naval artillery 
bombardments, and from actions by ground forces. If such 
dangers are to be minimized, there is a need for local knowledge, 
first-class intelligence, good decision-making, and skilled 
performance of military tasks. Not all UN forces and procedures 
are notably strong in all these respects. 
The third dilemma is that some (though not all) uses afforce 
risk undermining perceptions of the impartiality of the particular 
peacekeeping force involved. Such forces otien have grave 
difficulties in maintaining their impartiality anyway, especially if, 
as in Bosnia, humanitarian aid is needed more by one side than by 
another. A peacekeeping force, like any other force in an alien 
land, needs local allies and supporters, and will need them even 
more if it is engaged in hostilities. In such circumstances, 
impartiality must be a casualty. There may even be some risk that 
the impartiality of UN peacekeeping forces generally, and indeed 
of the UN itself, may be undermined. 
The fourth dilemma is that, while the UN system of decision-
making is not well geared to controlling major uses of force, there 
must be a reluctance to leave the decision In others when the lives 
or peacekccpcrs and the reputation or the UN arc at slake. lien cc 
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the long and complex discussions over the authority to use force 
in Bosnia - a matter in which national governments, NATO 
collectively, the UN Secretary-General, the UN Security Council, 
and the commanders of UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia and 
in Bosnia, all felt entitled to have a key role, or even veto. The 
UN's lack of serious institutional machinery for long-term 
strategic planning of particular operations only reinforced the 
weakness of this process. 
Despite all these dilemmas, the need for some intelligent 
means of using force in support of peacekeeping operations 
remains. If such means cannot be found, those operations will 
inevitably suffer a decline in credibility. Indeed, this already 
happened in 1993. The travails of the UN, and of the Western 
powers generally, in Bosnia and Somalia led to a decline in their 
credibility in certain other situations, including Haiti. 
Some attempts have been made to work out a new strategic 
role for the UN. Kofi Annan, UN Under-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations, said in an article in late 1993: 
Today's conflict,\' in Somalia and Bosnia have fundamentally redrawn 
the parameters. 11 is no longer enough to implement agreements or 
separate antagonists; the international community now wants the 
United Nation.\' to demarcate boundaries, control and eliminate 
heavy weapons, quell anarchy, and guarantee the delivery of 
humanitarian aid in war zone.\'. These are clearly tasko; that call jhr 
'teeth' and 'muscle~ in addition to less tangible qualities that we have 
sought in the past. In other word\·, there are increa\·ing demand\· that 
the United Nations now enjiJrce the peace, as originally envisaged in 
the Charter. 1 K 
Kofi Annan suggested that NATO could have a key role in the 
'peacekeeping with teeth' he was advocating. He saw the 
JH Koli A. Annan, 'UN Peacekeeping Operations and Cooperation 
with NATO', NATO Review, vol. 41, no. 5 (October 1993), p. 4. 
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involvement ofNA TO in peacekeeping operations as a major way 
past the main obstacle to success which he identified in the 
article--namely the reluctance of member states to translate 
commitment into action through supply of funds and forces. His 
article foreshadowed the discriminate and effective uses of air 
power in February 1994 in Bosnia, both to enforce the controls on 
artillery in the Sarajevo exclusion zone, and to stop military 
flights by belligerents. Yet this use of threat and reality of air 
power, altough it contributed to decisions to send additional 
Russian and British troops to Bosnia, has not totally transformed 
the general reluctance of states to commit ground forces in Bosnia 
while the risks there remain high. This reluctance is the product 
of factors which are enduring and not necessarily discreditable: a 
worry that the aims of an operation may be uncertain, mistaken, 
or the subject of disagreement between major powers; nervous-
ness about risking lives in a conflict in which national interests do 
not seem to be directly engaged; and a fear that major uses of 
force by peacekeepers could simply drag the UN down to the 
level of the belligerents. 
A more far-reaching proposal for a new UN military role has 
been made by John Ruggie. He has proposed that in civil war 
situations the United. Nations needs to adopt a clear strategy 'to 
deter, dissuade and deny {D')', adding that the task is to deny 
military victory to any one side, and 'to persuade local combatants 
that the use of force to resolve disputes will not succeed.'19 The 
trouble with such a proposal is that in many societies force does 
have some role, which cannot be eliminated entirely. Moreover, 
it is far from clear that there is anything like sufficient determ-
ination in the international community to teach such lessons to all 
local wielders offorce. The attempt to do so might risk creating 
19 John Gerard Ruggie, 'Wandering in the Void: Charting the UN's 
New Strategic Role', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 5 (November/Dec-
ember 1993), pp. 29-31. 
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for the UN a situation comparable to that feared by Pentagon 
planners in the early years of the Cold War, in which they worried 
about the possibility of having to take on all possible adversaries 
at the same time. 
Force, and the threat of force, have a role in the new 
peacekeeping. However, any application of force has to be 
discriminate both in thr choice of situations in which it is brought 
to bear, and in the timing and manner of its application. To rush 
into a generalized advocacy of the use of force, on a misguided 
assumption that the UN can succeed where so many states and 
ernpires have failed, is to invite disaster. The risks in the 
expansion of the concept of peacekeeping which we are currently 
witnessing, and of proposals for increased willingness to use 
force, are obvious. Major military activities in the name of 
peacekeeping may get mired in controversy, and tainted by 
failure. In the process, it is possible that traditional peacekeeping 
could suffer--with serious effects both on the willingness of states 
to agree to the presence of such forces, and the wi 11 ingness of 
donor countries to provide the desperately needed funds and 
forces without which no peacekeeping operation can get off the 
ground. 
Involvement of the Permanent Five and other powers 
Since 1992, peacekeeping operations have involved participation 
by military units from all five permanent members of the Security 
Council, and from some neighbours or near-neighbours {such as 
Thais and Chinese in Cambodia). They have also involved 
participation from powers which had hitherto been consti-
tutionally prevented from sending their armed forces into action 
abroad {Japan and Germany, in Cambodia and Somalia respect-
ively). These developments suggest that peacekeeping operations 
have become a symbol of the determination of the international 
community to see its decisions implemented. They constitute 
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additional evidence that peacekeeping has a more coercive aspect 
than hitherto. They also pose problems: major powers are 
naturally anxious to keep a degree of control over their forces, 
and there are inevitably concerns that their forces may reflect 
national military styles, and may serve national as well as 
international purposes. The US participation in UNOSOM 11 in 
Somalia from May 1993 to March 1994 provided a vivid and at 
times tragic illustration of such problems. 
4. In what types of crises can UN peacekeeping 
usefully be involved? 
In face of the crises which have now arisen, especially in Angola, 
Bosnia, and Somalia, a crucial issue to address is: in which types 
of situation is peacekeeping appropriate, and in which not? 
For its first several decades, virtually all UN peacekeeping was 
in areas which had experienced European colonialism and 
subsequent decolonization. In these areas, common problems of 
decolonization were encountered. New states emerged which 
lacked legitimate borders, regimes, and institutions; and in some 
cases lacked a notion of civic identity. In many parts of the post-
colonial world the great powers could agree on keeping out of 
such conflicts, and trying to prevent their internationalization. In 
these circumstances, handling the matter through UN peace-
keeping was usually a convenient, and sometimes an effective, 
approach. 
It is notorious that the interposition of lightly-armed UN 
peacekeeping forces only really had an effect locally when there 
was already some willingness on the part of warring states or 
groups to stick to a cease-fire: as there was, at various times, in 
Cyprus, and also between Israel and some of its neighbours. True, 
UN peacekeepers did also eventually succeed in what turned out 




in the 1960s. But that experience, which was traumatic for the 
UN, illustrated the difficulties as well as the possibilities of a 
more direct military role. 
The use of UN forces in civil wars has increased markedly in 
recent years, including in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, 
Georgia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, and fanner Yugoslavia. 
Tragic circumstances have led to persuasive calls for intervention, 
to which the UN has in many cases responded. This vastly 
increased use of UN peacekeeping and obeserver forces in bitter 
intra-state as well as inter-state conflicts raises serious problems." 
In many of these cases there has not been an effective cease-
fire, nor even any clear front lines; and the problems confronting 
UN forces have challenged many traditional assumptions of 
peacekeeping, including the principles of operating on the basis 
of consent, impartiality between the parties, and non-use of force 
except in self-defence. These recent interventions also raise a 
deeper question. Is such a pattern of intervention justified, or is 
the UN, at least in some cases, taking on problems which it is in 
fact incapable of solving? 
Some of the challenges now faced by the UN are not in 
themselves of a wholly new character: there have been some 
bitter civil and international wars in earlier decades (for example, 
in China before the 1949 revolution, in Vietnam for thirty years 
after 1946, and in Nigeria in the late 1960s) in which the UN did 
not get directly involved. What is new is not so much the number 
of conflicts, but rather the Security Council's ability to reach a 
decision to act in many (though by no means all) cases. 
On the other hand, some of the problems now addressed by the 
UN do have a special character, different from problems of earlier 
20 For thoughtful recent analyses, see Goulding, 'The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping', pp. 451-64; and Alan James, 'Internal Peace-keeping: A 
Dead End for the UN?', Security Dialogue, vol. 24, no. 4 (December 
1993), pp. 359-68. 
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decades. First, there are orphans of the Cold War: states, such as 
Somalia, whose collapse owes much not only to internal factors, 
but also to the withdrawal of superpower interest and support 
following the end of the Cold War. Left more to their own devices 
than before, some such states were bound to implode in more or 
less spectacular fashion. 
A second, and equally serious, set of challenges of the post-
Cold War era are those posed by the process of fission in the 
collapsed states of former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet 
Union. The crises arising from the disintegration of these federal 
states have proved in some respects no less difficult than the 
crises following European decolonization a generation earlier. 
They have raised questions about the appropriateness of asserting 
the instant and undifferentiated applicability of certain vital 
principles derived from the somewhat different context of inter-
state relations. The principle that the changing of frontiers by 
force can never be accepted is fundamental in contemporary 
international relations, and was immediately invoked by the 
international community in connection with the Yugoslav crisis." 
It was held to be applicable both because of the characterization 
of the crisis as a conflict between states, and because dangerous 
precedents could be set by successful grabs for territory on largely 
ethnic grounds. Yet there must be a question as to whether it was 
wise to express this legal principle so forcefully in the special 
context of the disintegration of federal states where, as in this 
case, some of the existing 'frontiers' have no physical existence 
and lack both logic and legitimacy, where there are such deep-
21 See e.g. the Declaration of 3 Sept. 1991 of the CSCE states; SC 
Res. 713 of 25 Sept. 1991, and numerous subsequent Security Council 
resolutions; the Statement on the Situation in Yugoslavia, issued by the 
North Atlantic Council meeting in Rome, 7-8 Nov. 1991, para. 2; and the 
Statement of Principles adopted on 26 Aug. 1992 by the London 




seated ethnic problems, and where almost any imaginable 
outcome short of massive conflagration involves some de facto 
success for those who have sought to change frontiers by force. 
It is sobering to reflect that following European decolonization 
the taboo against changing frontiers by force operated more or 
less effectively for decades: whereas in parts of former 
Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, it broke down within 
weeks or months of the achievement of independence. There 
remain many problems in these areas which may yet draw in the 
UN, and risk involving it in deep and unrewarding entanglements. 
In former Yugoslavia, as if there were not already crises and 
conflicts enough, there is the possibility of a deeper UN 
involvement in Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia; not to mention 
within Serbia, where the vulnerable position of Albanians in 
Kosovo, and Hungarians in Vojvodina, may yet lead to pressures 
to intervene. In the former Soviet Union, there are already several 
major wars within and between successor republics. 
There is no reason, apart from prudence and exhaustion, why 
the UN should not involve itself directly in the post-Soviet 
conflicts--or at any rate in the ones which can be considered inter-
state in character. In fact, however, the UN as an institution, and 
its leading member states, have been nervous about getting 
involved in these conflicts in the ex-USSR. There have been 
many UN missions there, but no serious UN peacekeeping 
operation apart from the very small and near-irrelevant UN 
Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). This reluctance of 
outside powers, and of the UN, to get involved in peacekeeping 
in the former Soviet Union poses an awkward problem. Those 
who advocate a universal and consistent system of UN peace-
keeping need to take account of the understandable weariness of 
institutions and states when faced with so daunting an array of 
conflicts. A regional approach may be required. 
The Russian government clearly realises that the international 
community is not about to launch into a major series of 
peacekeeping eperations in the former Soviet Union. Instead, it is 
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seeking some kind of international association with actions that 
may be taken in the 'near abroad'. On 4 February 1994, Russian 
defence minister Pave! Grachev appealed for a strong UN 
mandate to carry out peacekeeping missions in the former Soviet 
republics. He was quoted as saying: 'Some Western countries 
reproach us for sending too few peacekeepers to Bosnia, but we 
have already allocated more than 16,000 servicemen to carry out 
peacekeeping missions in the former Soviet Union. We carry out 
an important task and deserve a stronger UN mandate to 
accomplish it.'22 Needless to say, the governments of many former 
Soviet republics view such statements as evidence of a sinister 
attempt to recreate a collapsed empire. lt is certainly true that any 
interventions are bound to have a different character from any 
known form of UN peacekeeping. However, this is not a reason 
to reject the Russian appeal out of hand: the international 
community could engage in a serious dialogue with Russia about 
the circumstances, legal basis, national composition, and 
functions of future peacekeeping missions in the former Soviet 
Union. 
The problems involved in any such missions are vast. The 
situations which the post-Cold War order has thrown up--
Somalia, former Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union 
providing the clearest examples--are in many cases peculiarly 
difficult to tackle by means of UN peacekeeping. In particular: 
• There is no reliable cease-fire between the parties, so fighting 
continues. 
• The bewildering array of non-state and state entities involved, 
and of regular and guerrilla forces, means that it is unclear 
22 Reuter report from Moscow, International Herald Tribune, 
London, 5-6 February 1994, p. 4. 
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which individual leaders actually have the capacity to reach . 
agreements and implement them. 
* There is no single, stable or clear front line between the parties 
of a kind which a peacekeeping force might be able to patrol. 
* Peacekeeping troops dispatched to these countries are in a 
situation of great danger, and in protecting themselves may 
well find that they have to lean toward, or against, particular 
parties to a dispute, thus endangering their much-valued 
impartiality. 
One could conclude from all this that the UN must confine its 
activities rigidly to situations in which it can stick safely to what 
is seen (rightly or wrongly) as the classic approach to peace-
keeping: operating with consent of the parties, avoiding the use of 
force except in immediate self-defence, and maintaining 
impartiality between the parties to a conflict. Whether or not there 
ever was a pure golden age of peacekeeping, such a simple return 
to the old approach seems inadequate. Peacekeeping has changed 
because its old incarnations had faults, and also because the 
challenges it faces have changed. New approaches are certainly 
needed in face of new challenges. 
Yet new approaches will be of no use whatsoever if those 
involved in UN decision-making adopt an unimaginative and 
mechanical approach to their implementation. There is a strong 
tendency in UN circles to talk of 'preventive diplomacy', 
'preventive deployment', 'peacekeeping', 'peace-making', and 
'peace-enforcement', as if between them these techniques 
constituted a full set of UN tools for addressing virtually any 
problem. They do not. There are many problems, of many types, 
which have eluded the best efforts of statesmen to address them 
over centuries, and will do so again. If we are to grasp the real 
opportunities which the present moment in international history 
offers, we need to temper our enthusiasm with a sense of tragedy, 
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an awareness of the sheer difficulty of problems now being faced, 
and a recognition that every crisis is unique. There are no reach-
me-down tool-kits or all-purpose answers. 
The pressures on an international organization to tackle all 
problems impartially, in accord with agreed criteria, are very 
great. Unlike states, the UN cannot simply proclaim lack of direct 
interest in a conflict as a reason for non-involvement. Hence An 
Agenda for Peace becomes, only too easily, an agenda for endless 
involvement. This agenda--with its unpalatable consequences in 
terms of burdens undertaken, peacekeepers' lives lost, heavy 
expense, and political fall-out--inevitably produces its own 
reacti.on. All sorts of agendas appear on how not to get involved 
in distant conflicts. 
It is sometimes suggested that the UN should simply steer 
clear of civil wars. It was not designed to tackle them, its Charter 
does not deal with them, and many involvements in civil wars 
. have been costly and unrewarding. However, such a rule of 
thumb, saving the UN from involvement in one major class of 
trouble, could hardly work in practice. Many, even most, civil 
wars are also at the same time international wars, or at least have 
a large and potentially dangerous international dimension. 
Further, the UN has had some notable successes in helping end 
certain largely internal conflicts, including in El Salvador and 
Cambodia." 
An attempt to devise an even more radical rule of thumb for 
avoiding foreign involvement is the division of the world into 
'zones of peace' and 'zones of turmoil'. In this view, 85 per cent of 
the world is assigned to the latter category, and there is nothing to 
be done about it.24 This pessimistic approach, reminiscent of 
23 For a balanced discussion of the difficulty of tackling civil wars, 
see Alan James, 'Internal Peace-keeping: A Dead End for the UN?'. 
24 Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zones 
of Peace. Zones of Turmoil, Chatham House Publishers, Chatham, ew 
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ancient divisions of the world into 'civilized nations' and 
'barbarians', does not deserve to be taken seriously as a de-
scription of the world, the troubles of which are not neatly 
parcelled into zones. Yet it has strength in its appeal to an 
understandable isolationist instinct in the USA following periods 
of heavy overseas involvement and numerous disappointments. 
Other attempts to devise criteria to limit UN activities have 
included President Clinton's speech at the United Nations General 
Assembly on 27 September 1993, in which he warned against the 
UN's reach exceeding its grasp, and suggested conditions for US 
participation in new missions, including: 
• Is there a real threat to international peace? 
• Does the proposed mission have clear objectives? 
• Can an end-point to UN participation be seen? 
• How much does it cost? 
These suggested conditions are hardly new, nor are they 
problem-free. In particular, the characteristic and understandable 
US anxiety to work out in advance an end-point to an operation, 
coupled with the equally understandable US worry about 
casualties, can actually encourage local leaders in a course of 
obstinacy, knowing that they can outlast an embattled peace-
keeping force. 
Problems such as these - as well as difficulties over sensitive 
issues of funding, and also subjecting US troops to foreign 
command - help to explain the repeated delays in 1993 and early 
1994 in finalising President Clinton's long-awaited policy 
document, or Presidential Decision Directive, on the subject of 
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. 
There is simply no substitute for the exercise of judgement 
about involvement or non-involvement in particular conflicts. 
Jersey, 1993. 
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Above all, in the post-Cold War era, the members of the Security 
Council need to be discriminating both in which problems they 
tackle, and in the manner in which they do so. They need to be 
discriminating in two ways: (I) There is sometimes a case for 
deciding not to tackle a problem, even if it is desperately serious, 
and even if it constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security. If there is insufficient will to stay the course, or no clear 
idea of what solution the UN seeks to bring about, or no adequate 
local basis for seeing to the implementation of a settlement, it 
may be best for the UN to avoid undertaking a burden which is 
likely to end with a humiliating exit. (2) In cases where the UN 
does decide to set up a peacekeeping operation, it needs to have 
a clear overall strategic purpose, and an operation geared to the 
particular needs of the country. Yet the UN is not always good at 
long-term strategic thinking. One of the reasons for this is 
inherent in the whole process of multilateral diplomacy.lt is very 
difficult to get all the members of the Security Council to agree 
on the terms of resolutions dealing with immediate crises, without 
worrying about long-term goals, consideration of which can 
always wait. 
5. What key issues now need to be addressed? 
Despite its current difficulties, UN peacekeeping still has some 
solid qualities which it should not lose in the new era. UN 
peacekeeping is still, in many parts of the world, acceptable in a 
way that a purely national or even regional military presence 
would not be. Further, UN peacekeeping has an impressive record 
of achievement in isolating some conflicts from regional or great 
power rivalry. 
The UN has been compelled to confront the severe problems 
of peacekeeping in situations of endemic conflict, but is bound to 
have grave difficulty in coming up with answers. The problem is 
not just that the UN lacks a satisfactory command system capable 
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of taking quick decisions and able to coordinate effectively the 
many different types of force and national contingents deployed. 
There is as yet little sign of the emergence of a satisfactory 
doctrine or practice regarding operations which have an 
essentially hybrili__ character, involving elements of both 
peacekeeping and enforcement. 
An important question of terminology follows. It must 
doubtful whether it is right to hi-jack the respected term 
'peacekeeping' and apply it to actions which are not based on the 
full consent of all the parties, and which involve extensive use of 
force. Is there not something Orwellian about this, as also in such 
terms as 'peace-enforcement'? Turning a familiar saying on its 
head, one could comment on much recent action and discussion 
in the field of peacekeeping: 'C'est magnifique, mais c'est la 
guerre.' And yet what has happened undoubtedly represents an 
evolution of peacekeeping, has preserved some of its character-
istics, and has overcome some of its earlier weaknesses. It would 
be politically impractical, and doctrinally unwise, to try to give 
current UN multi-national military operations a new name. 
There remain limits to what international peacekeeping can 
achieve in face of determined states and armed groups: especially 
in situations where troop-contributing states will only make a 
limited commitment to an operation, and have difficulties in 
achieving and holding an international consensus on its means 
and objectives. 
The extent of UN control over peacekeeping operations 
remains inevitably unclear. The experience of peacekeeping 
operations in several countries, particularly Yugoslavia and 
Somalia, has exposed the problematic relation between UN 
command and national command. States supplying forces, and 
their commanders in the field, have remained independent 
decision-makers, reluctant to defer to UN command, especially in 
matters relating to the safety of their troops, or to the use of air 
power or other advanced weaponry. Indeed, the simple pro-
position could be advanced: the greater the elements of military 
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risk in an operation, the more will governments be nervous about 
handing over control of their forces to the UN. 
In face of a baffling range of problems, and the Undoubted 
need to restore the credibility of some battered UN peacekeeping 
operations, it is not surprising that many have come to advocate 
peacekeeping with muscles: including more reliance on major 
military forces and alliances. While events are indeed moving in 
this direction, the problems peacekeeping faces are more 
numerous and complex than such a formulation might suggest. 
If peacekeeping is to adapt successfully to even some of the 
difficult problems it is asked to tackle, the following issues must 
be addressed. 
a. Criteria for involvement in particular conflicts 
As disappointment with the idea of a universal system of 
peacekeeping grows, there is an urgent need for reconsideration 
of the criteria to be used by national governments, and by the UN, 
in discussions about whether peacekeeping forces are an 
appropriate response to particular conflicts. There are signs that 
states are retreating from the idea of universal obligations in 
defence of international norms into a reliance on the familiar, and 
sometimes extremely limited, concept of national interest. While 
such a reaction is inevitable, there is a need to consider other 
criteria as well. The most important is whether a given conflict is 
of such a type that the UN has a significant comparative 
advantage in addressing it. 
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b. Management by the Security Council and Secretariat 
The methods of decision-making and management in respect of 
UN peacekeeping operations are odd and are likely to come under 
increasing scrutiny." Indeed, the more the UN has to be 
discriminating about its involvements, the more important it will 
be that its decision's are seen to be the work of bodies whose 
composition is acc~pted as legitimate, and whose work is 
procedurally fair. 
Defects in the actual management of peacekeeping·forces are 
commonly said to be the result of 'UN bureaucracy', but that 
broad-brush accusation often misses the mark. The so-called 
bureaucracy is actually quite small, and among its numerous 
problems are the need to follow procedural arrangements 
established by the General Assembly; and to abide by rules and 
regulations which result from attempts to ensure financial 
efficiency. The requirements for competitive bidding for materials 
needed by forces in the field, imposing as they do terrible delays, 
are a notorious case in point. 
One central problem so far as management is concerned is the 
lack of a serious acceptance of responsibility by any one 
individual or country for the efficient running of an operation. 
When things go wrong, the UN system provides far too many 
possibilities of buck-passing, not only within the organization, but 
more importantly between member states on the one hand and the 
organization on the other. Many things are going wrong in 
peacekeeping at the moment--so much so that the Security 
Council and the Secretariat may come to be seen as thoroughly 
fallible bodies. The question is bound to arise: what realistically 
can be done to prevent the recurrence of mistakes and disasters? 
25 For a fine survey, see Mats R. Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping?, 
Adelphi Paper 281, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 
1993. 
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There will only be a real interest in the important cause of 
improving the UN management of peacekeeping forces ifthere is 
also confidence in the judgements made at the UN. The answer 
from national capitals may well be the dismal one that states will 
become more, not less, cautious about contributing money and 
forces for UN operations. 
c. Intelligence, command and control 
In difficult and dangerous operations, officers naturally want the 
best systems of intelligence, and the best forms of command and 
control. that they can get. They need quick decisions, and ones in 
which they can have some trust. Inevitably, at present they tend 
to fall back onto the resources of their own countries in these 
matters. Thus a multi-national peacekeeping force may have 
different contingents pulling in different directions. Any answer 
to this problem needs to go well beyond the action taken in 1993--
the creation of the 'situation room' at UN Headquarters in New 
York, intended to keep lines open to all ongoing peacekeeping 
operations at the same time. Among other actions needed is the 
appointment, for each operation, of a better equipped directing 
group, with more resources at its disposal. There is a very strong 
case for setting up an integrated task force at UN Headquarters for 
each peacekeeping operation. 
lt remains an open question whether such a directing group 
might sometimes be best created on a national basis, and 
answerable to its country's institutions, rather than on an inter-
national basis, answerable to the Secretary-General and the 
Security Council. It may be that the demands of peacekeeping in 
situations of great danger will lead to peacekeeping--like the 
authorization of force in Korea and the Gulf--being 'sub-
contracted' to a particular country or regional organization, which 
would play a lead role in a given operation. Despite obvious 




times be better at long-term management of operations than is the 
UN. Syria's role in Lebanon has in some respects been more 
effective than those of either the UN or the multi-national 
peacekeeping forces which have operated there. 
d. Use of farce by or an be ha(( of peacekeeping farces 
Peacekeepers in contemporary conflicts have been under intense 
pressure to use force for various purposes, including delivery of 
humanitarian relief, punishment of attacks on UN personnel, 
prevention of atrocities or flagrant aggression, and compelling 
parti~s who have agreed to a peace settlement to comply with it. 
Such pressure to take military action has raised several problems. 
UN troops may have to choose between losing credibility and 
losing impartiality. They risk being ·perceived simply as one 
additional belligerent party. They may readily become targets for 
retaliation. In many situations, UN peacekeeping forces must of 
necessity avoid major uses of force. They may be of insufficient 
size, lacking in major armaments, restricted by their mandates and 
the views of their national governments, and lacking the popular 
political support to engage in major offensive operations. 
Yet the costs of military inaction by UN forces may also be 
high. As in Yugoslavia, UN forces may be formally defined as a 
protection force, yet unable to protect beleaguered local 
communities. They may be unable to prevent or punish visible 
and continuing atrocities. The situation in Bosnia, until the 
developments of February 1994, exposed the stark problems of 
attempting a peacekeeping operation in a situation where there is 
no peace to keep. The Bosnian Muslims' perception of an 
ineffectual UN was compounded by its arms embargo on former 
Yugoslavia, which has affected them heavily: they argue that this 
deprived them of the right of self-defence at a time when the UN 
was unable to provide any other protection. 
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The UN Security Council will have to be willing to authorize 
certain uses of force in connection with peacekeeping operations, 
especially in situations of endemic civil wars. US uses of force in 
Somalia in 1993, and .NATO's uses of air power in Bosnia in 
February 1994, are illustrations of a significant trend in this 
direction. Yet ensuring that any use of force is geared to 
realizable objectives and remains controlled is astonishingly 
difficult. There is bound to be a risk of UN forces behaving like 
a beleaguered colonial garrison. It is very hard to achieve fairness 
and balance in the use of force within a country, as between the 
various parties to a conflict; and it is equally hard to achieve 
anything like fairness and balance in the choice of conflicts in 
which force is authorized. There are almost bound to be 
accusations of'double standards'. 
e. The question of privileging UN forces 
With peacekeeping troops in obvious danger .in many con-
temporary conflicts, a peculiarly difficult question is emerging, or 
rather re-emerging. When UN peacekeeping forces are involved 
in hostilities, are they to be regarded (at least for the purposes of 
the operation of the laws of armed conflict) simply as be-
lligerents, on an equal footing with other parties? Or are they in 
some way in a superior position?26 In recent years there has been 
a revival of the idea that UN forces are entitled to receive 
assistance and cooperation from local parties, at least when 
26 For earlier discussions, see e.g. the 1971 Zagreb Resolution of the 
Institute of International Law on 'Conditions of Application of 
Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in which United 
Nations Forces May Be Engaged', reprinted in Adam Roberts and 
Richard Guelff(eds.), Documents on the Laws ofWar, 2nd edn., Oxford 
University Press, 1989, pp. 371-5. 
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carrying out such tasks as delivery of humanitarian aid. This can 
easily lead to the argument that those who oppose or threaten UN 
forces are in some way 'outlaws'. While it is natural to want to 
give UN forces a privileged status as against other parties, there 
are potential dangers in any doctrine or practice of this kind. It 
could lead to a new kind of colonial mentality, and to a general 
undermining of the laws of war because UN forces failed to treat 
their adversaries as legitimate belligerents. 
UN peacekeeping and ·observer forces are invitably involved 
in other complex issues connected with the laws of war, or what 
is now widely called international humanitarian law. For example, 
the conflicts in former Yugoslavia have forced them to confront 
the issue of how to respond to massive violations of the most 
basic rules of war by belligerents. Inasmuch as a clear answer has 
emerged, it appears to be that information on violations may be 
recorded and passed on, at least by some national contingents 
through their own national authorities; but UN peacekeepers have 
not yet been involved in actually arresting suspected war 
criminals and holding them for trial. 
Quite apart from such international legal issues, the expansion 
of UN peacekeeping activities has highlighted a huge range of 
ethical and diciplinary issues: there have been reports of UN 
personnel being involved in the illicit sale of diesel oil, use of 
child prostitutes, and illegal smuggling. As well as better training 
(discussed below), such practices point to the need for a stronger 
and more uniform code of dicipline. 
f The changing meaning of impartiality 
In UN peacekeeping, impartiality is no longer in practice 
interpreted to mean in every case impartiality between the parties 
to a conflict. In some conflicts there may, and perhaps should, be 
more toughness with one party than with another, or more aid to 
one than another. In several cases since 1988 in which UN 
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peacekeeping has been involved, there have also been economic 
sanctions against a particular state or party. There have also been 
some arms embargoes. Yet there are important elements in the 
notion of impartiality which should not be lost, including the idea 
that the UN represents a set of interests, values and tasks which 
are distinct in some respects from those of any one belligerent. In 
some operations, 'impartiality' may have come to mean, not 
impartiality between the belligerents, but impartiality in carrying 
out Security Council decisions. 
g. The question of permanent armed forces 
The idea of a standing UN force comprised of professionals 
recruited on a voluntary basis has been advanced by Sir Brian 
Urquhart." There has also been some discussion of having UN 
standing forces on some other basis--for example through the 
hitherto moribund Article 43 of the Charter. Such proposals are 
not limited to peacekeeping. A standing force along one or other 
of these lines would have the merit that it would give the 
Secretary-General and/or the Security Council a capacity for a 
fast military response in certain crises, for example in assisting a 
state threatened by external attack. However, the proposal faces 
problems. The sheer variety of tasks tackled by the UN make it 
improbable that a standing force could be ready for all of them. 
The proposal is of limited relevance to certain key challenges 
faced by the UN. Somalia and Bosnia have cast doubt on the 
capabilities of even quite large professional forces to carry out 
difficult tasks: in these cases it is more the fact of involvement 
the specific mandates of the forces, and the decision-makin~ 
27 See Brian Urquhart, 'For a UN Volunteer Military Force', New York 
Review of Books, I 0 June 1993, pp. 3-4, and comments in subsequent 
issues. 
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procedures under which they operate, which are the main issues 
for debate. Further, the volunteer force proposal has run up 
against the familiar problem that governments seem resistant to 
the idea of endowing the UN with an independent military 
capacity, and to financing it. 
h. Involvement in administration and trusteeship 
In countries in which the UN has become involved in peace-
keeping because of a general breakdown of government, the 
organization and its leading members are deeply reluctant to take 
over responsibility for government. For the most part the UN role 
in government has been confined to administrative assistance, 
training, helping to hold or monitor elections, and generally 
giving advice. In some countries where government scarcely 
exists, such roles are inadequate, and the question of a more direct 
if hopefully temporary administration has to be addressed. 
Naturally it is not a popular subject to raise. We may be in an 
imperial situation today, but who are the imperialists? Except in 
cases of regional hegemony, old-fashioned forms of the direct 
exercise of dominance are out of fashion. No country is rushing 
to take up the White Man's Burden. In some circumstances there 
may be good reasons to establish a temporary externally-imposed 
administrative system, at least when such a proposal has the 
active support of all parties to a dispute. The absence of an 
administrative role may sometimes have the effect of restricting 
the options available to UN forces to primarily military ones. 
i. Language 
UN forces are often crippled by language problems, of two kinds. 
First, different contingents in the same force may have great 
difficulty in communicating with each other: there have been 
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much-publicized cases of this in Bosnia. Second, the contingents 
may not be able to communicate effectively with the local 
population: this is particularly crippling where there is a need for 
intelligence, policing and administration. 
j. Training 
Troops involved in UN peacekeeping forces have been, and are, 
of extraordinarily uneven quality. Despite the UN's urgent need 
for such forces, there must be a higher basic standard which 
forces are required to meet before they can be dispatched in a 
peacekeeping mode. This is one matter which some states and 
their armed forces are already beginning to address. 
k. Finance 
Setting up a UN peacekeeping operation has been aptly called a 
'financial bungee jump'. Peacekeeping is in a more or less 
continuous state of financial crisis. The system of apportionment 
of peacekeeping costs among UN member states has caused 
problems with various major powers. The United States has long 
been expected to bear over 30 per cent of the costs and wants that 
figure reduced to 25 per cent. Russia is also concerned about the 
present system, partly because it faces heavy tasks maintaining 
order in its immediate environment. By contrast, over ISO states 
are apportioned for peacekeeping at a either one tenth or one fifth 
of their regular UN dues: a situation which requires some 
modification. An additional problem is that dues for each 
peacekeeping operation are collected separately, so each UN 
member-state receives a large number of bills in any given year, 
sometimes for operations in which it may feel little stake. The 
question of apportionment, and effective payment, of peace-
keeping dues has to be addressed by the 1994 General Assembly. 
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Whatever the outcome, the ongoing financial crises is likely to 
remain a major constraint on the expansion of UN peacekeeping. 
• •• 
In conclusion, the problems which peacekeeping now faces, 
and will go on facing in coming years, are such as to confirm that 
we are very far still from any form of global governance that 
involves a truly global capacity for peacekeeping. The system of 
UN peacekeeping is, and is likely to remain, patchy, ad hoc, and 
more appropriate to some situations than to others. It is vital that 
its achievements, its reputation, and its future possibilities should 
not be undermined by its application to too many conflicts, and by 
failure to address some of the hard questions it now faces. 
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Appendix: List of UN peacekeeping and observer 
forces" 
This is a chronological list of the thirty-three UN peacekeeping and 
observer forces whose composition includes military or police units 
contributed for the purpose by member states. This list does not refer to 
smaller special missions, investigatory panels, election monitors where 
there was no peacekeeping element, advisory groups, or deployments of 
UN guards. Nor does it include the UN authorized forces in Korea 1950-
3 and in the Gulf 1990-1, nor the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in 
Somalia in I 992-3. 
Information is given in the form: Name afforce (acronym), location, 
years of operation, a principal authorizing resolution. Maximum 
strength. Strength on 31 March 1993 (if applicable). There are some 
variations on this format, especially as regards recently established 
forces. 
(a) Established up to 1978 
I. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), several areas in 
the Middle East. 1948-, SC Res. 54 of 15 July 1948. Maximum strength: 
572 (1948). Strength in March 1993:239. 
2. United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (-
UNMOGJP). Jammu and Kashmir. 1949-, SC Res. 47 of21 April 1948. 
Maxtmum strength: 102 (October 1965). Strength in March 1993: 38. 
3. United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF /),Suez Canal, Sinai, Gaza, 1956-
67, GA Res. 1000 (ES-1) of 5 November 1956 and GA Res. 1001 (ES-1) of 
7 November 1956. Maximum strength: 6,073 (February 1957). 
" This list is adapted from the one published in Roberts and 
Kingsbury (eds.), United Nations, Divided World, 2nd edn., 1993, pp. 
538-4 I. Information on last four operations listed is from Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. 
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4. United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOG/L), Lebanon, 1958, SC 
Res. 128 of 11 June 1958. Maximum strength: 591 (November 1958). 
5. United Nations Operation in the Congo (Operation des Nations Unies pour 
le Congo = ONUC), Republic of the Congo, 1960-4, SC Res. 143 of 14 July 
1960. Maximum strength: 19.828 (July 1961). 
6. United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF), established to 
assist the United Nations Temporary Executive Agency (UNTEA), West 
lrian, 1962-3, GA Res. 1752 (XVII) of 21 September 1962. Maximum 
strength: 1.576. 
7. United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), Yemen. 1963-4, SC. 
Res. 179 of 11 June 1963. Maximum strength: 189. 
8. United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFJCYP), Cyprus, 1964-, 
SC Res. 186 of 4 March 1964. Maximum strength: 6,411 (June 1964). 
Strength in March 1993: 1,531. 
9. Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-Genera/ in the Dominican 
Republic(DOMREP), Dominican Republic, 1965-6, SC Res. 203 of 14 May 
1965. Strength: 2. 
10. United Nations India-Pakistan ObservationMission (UN/POM), 
India-Pakistan border, 1965-6. SC Res. 211 of 20 September 1965. 
Maximum strength: 96 (October 1965). 
11. United Nations Emergency Force 11 (UNEF 11). Suez Canal, Sinai. 1973-9, 
SC Res. 340 of 25 October 1973. Maximum strength: 6.973 (February 
1974). 
12. United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDO F), Golan Heights, 
1974-, SC Res. 350 of 31 May 1974. Authorized strength: I ,450. Strength 
in March 1993:1,121. 
13. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), southern Lebanon. 
1978-, SC Res. 425 and 426 of 19 March 1978. Authorized strength: 7.000. 











(b) Established Since 1988 
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(UNGOMAP), Afghanistan and Pakistan, April 1988-March 1990, se 
Res. 622 of31 October 1988. Maximum strength: 50 (May 1988). 
United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIJMOG), Iran and 
Iraq, August 1988-February 1991, se Res. 598 of20 July !987 and se 
Res. 619 of9 August 1988. Strength: 399 (June 1990). 
United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM /), Angola, 
January 1989-June 1991, Se Res. 626 of20 December 1988. Maximum 
strength: 70 (April-December 1989). 
United Nati?ns Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), Namibia and 
Angola, Apnl 1989-March 1990, se Res. 435 of29 September !978 and 
Se Res. 632 of 16 February 1989. Maximum military strength: 4,493 
(November 1989). 
U~ited Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, December !989-
January 1992, Se Res. 644 of 7 November !989. Maximum strength: 
1,098 (May !990). 
United Nat~ons Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UN/KOM), Kuwait-Iraq 
DMZ, Apnl 1991-, Se Res. 689 of9 April 199! and se Res. 806 of5 
February 1993. Authorized strength: 500. Strength in March !993: 71 
troops, 247 military observers. 
United Nations Angola Verification Mission 11 (UNAVEM 11), Angola, 
June 199!-, Se Res. 696 of 30 May 1991. Maximum strength: 350 
m1htary observers, 126 police monitors, 400 electoral observers 
(September 1992). Strength in March 1993: 75 military observers 30 
police monitors. ' 
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), El Salvador, 
July 1991-, S~ Res. 693 of20 May 1991 and Se Res. 729 of 14 January 
19~2. Authorized strength: 1,000 military and police, 146 international 
CIVIlian staff(mainly human rights observers). Strength in March 1993: 










United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 
(MINURSO), Western Sahara, September 1991-. Se Res. 658 of27 June 
1990. Authorized strength: 1,695 military observers and troops, 300 
police, and up to 1,000 civilians. Strength in March 1993:224 military 
observers, 110 troops. 
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), Cambodia, 
October !991-March 1992, Se Res. 717 of 16 October 1991. Strength: 
380. Absorbed by UNTAe. 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Monte-
negro), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, March I 992- , Se 
Res. 743 of21 February 1992, se Res. 761 of29 June 1992, Se Res. 776 
of 14 September 1992, se Res. 795 of I I December 1992. Se Res. 836 
of 4 June I 993. Authorized strength: over 20,000. Strength in March 
1993: 22,534 troops, 394 military observers, 621 civilians/police. 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Cambodia, 
March 1992-December 1993, Se Res. 745 of28 February 1992. Replaced 
and absorbed the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia 
(UNAMIC). Authorized strength: up to 20,000 (military; civilian police; 
electoral; civil administration; human rights; repatriation; rehabilitation). 
Strength in March 1993: 3,578 civilians/police, 15,023 troops, 488 
military observers. 
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM /), Somalia, April 1992-
April !993, Se Res. 751 of24 April 1992 and se Res. 775 of28 August 
1992. Strength in March 1993:893 troops. Absorbed by UNOSOM Il. 
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), Mozambique, 
December !992- , se Res. 797 of !6 December 1992. Authorized 
strength: 7,000-8,000. Strength in March 1993: 1,082 troops, 153 
observers. 
United Nations Operation in Somalia 11 (UNOSOM If), May I 993- , Se 
Res. 814 of26 March 1993: Authorized strength: approx. 30,000. 
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), Uganda-
Rwanda border, August 1993-, se Res. 846 of22 June 1993. Authorized 





30. United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNO M/G), Georgia, se 
Res. 858 of24 August 1993. Authorized strength: 88 militwy observers. 
31. United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), Liberia, SC Res. 866 of22 
September 1993. Authorized strength: 303 military observers, 20 military 
medical personnel, 45 military engineers, 129 international and local staff. 
32. United Nations Mission in Haiti (UN M/H), Haiti, SC Res. 867 of 23 
September 1993. The force was to comprise: 567 UN police monitors and 
a military construction unit with a strength of approximately 700. 
33. United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMJR), Rwanda, se 
Res. 872 of 5 October 1993. Strength by staged deployment, envisaged 
as consisting at its height of 2,548 personnel. 
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